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COMMERCIAL SPACE OPPOR'l'UNITIES FROM 'l'BE SOVIET UNION 
* William B. Wirin 
Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer 
The Space Commerce Corporation 
The Space Commerce Corporation and GLAVKOSMOS 
began a joint venture on January 1, 1989. This 
agreement makes available to the entire world the vast 
array of goods and services in the Soviet space 
program. Businessmen, corporations, and civil space 
agencies now have access to the robust space capability 
and infrastructure of the U.S.S.R. This historic 
development in the commercial ization of space 
activities is made even more dramatic by the commitment 
to make these services and products available under the 
terms and conditions specified by the buyer. We do it 
your way. 
The primary capabilities available are: launch 
service; communications satellites; remote sensing 
information; and microgravity opportunities for 
materials processing. 
INTROOOC'lIOR 
There is now the opportuni ty for pr ivate firms and 
entrepreneurs to take part in the commercial space arena. Up to 
now, the businessman has been stifled in his attempts to make the 
space market prof itable due to government dominance of the field. 
The opportunity now presents itself for the entrepreneur to forge 
out into space limited only by the constraints of the Outer Space 
Treaty of 1967. 
The Joint Venture provides that SCC shall market all Soviet 
space goods and services, including: 
A. Marketing launch and associated services for commercial 
and scientific spacecraft including communications satellites; 
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B. Marketing experimental and associated services in the 
space environment, including man tended services on Soviet space 
stations and the use of automatic systems; 
C. Marketing Soviet space hardware and component parts of 
launch vehicles and spacecraft; 
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D. Production of technical literature descr ibing Sov iet I 
space goods and services; 
E. Production of advertising mater ial s for marketing 
Soviet space goods and services; I 
F. Marketing Soviet space goods and services through trade 
shows, conferences and scientific meetings; 
G. Obtaining the technical information and governmental 
approvals required to market Soviet space goods and services; 
H. Marketing the services of Soviet communications, remote 
sensing and navigation satellites; 
1. Marketing and 
educational activities 
facilities1 
conducting 
including 
technical 
visi ts to 
tr ai ni ng and 
Sov iet space 
J. Providing engineering and technical services including 
the design and construction of space apparatus, spacecraft and 
facilities; 
K. Conducting public relations activities. 
This listing is meant to be illustrative and not exhaustive. 
We trust that innovative entrepreneurs will suggest new ways to 
turn a profit from the resources of the Soviet space program. 
What makes this opportuni ty truly unique is that pr ior to 
now, every space program in the world has been instigated, 
managed and controlled by a government. The restr ictions and 
labyrinth of procedures necessary to obtain space services have 
had a chilling effect on the businessman. Therefore, it is truly 
remarkable that it is through a social ist society that the free 
enterprise businessman will have the first legitimate opportunity 
to utilize space. 
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SOVIET SPACE CAPABILITIES** 
Few people in the world outside of military circles 
appreciate the full capability of the Soviet space programs. 
Sov iet space activities in recent years leave no doubt of the 
vitality and commitment of the most prolific space program in the 
world. Less than four weeks after the celebration of the 30th 
anniversary of the space age, the launch of Sputnik I on 
Octobe r 4, 1957, the sov iet Union achieved its 2,0 OOth space 
mission, compared with less than 1,000 for the rest of the world 
combined. In all, the Soy iets reached Earth orbi t 90 times in 
1988 payloads while the United States and the rest of the world 
could only muster 26 space 'flights. 
Although the second lowest annual launch rate for the Soviet 
Union in the 1980' s, the year's total was only 5% below the 
decade's average and was caused pr imarily by temporary technical 
problems within two programs. Despite the recoveries and 
expansions underway in the space programs of the Uni ted States 
and the European Space Agency, the Soviet Union is likely to 
retain her crown of the most active space-faring nation - a title 
she has held for 22 years - into the foreseeable future. In all, 
the Soviet Union placed 108 new satellites into Earth orbit 
during the year. 
As must be expected with a space program of such magnitude, 
setbacks are not uncommon, and in 1988 the sov iets exper ienced 
more major failures than usual. Within the first two months of 
the year five Kosmos satellites were lost: three navigation 
satellites to a launch failure of the SL-12 booster and two 
photographic reconnaissance satellites which had to be destroyed 
in separate incidents when they failed to respond to commands. 
The greatest shock was the loss of the irreplaceable Phobos 1 
spacecr aft due to a simple software error. Meanwhile, the 
ambitious program to explore Mars in the 1990's appeared to be in 
disarray most of the time and ended the year with another 
schedule delay and more modest near-term obj ectives. 
Throughout the summer, an uncontrolled nuclear-powered 
spacecraft slowly fell to Earth, only to be saved in the eleventh 
hour by a fortui tous series of events. Equally alarming were 
malfunctions on two successive manned spacecraft which resulted 
in aborted reentries. The first large scientific module for Mir 
was again postponed, and three different geophysical and 
astrophysical spacecraft failed to make promised launches. 
** The author is indebted to Dr. Nicholas L. Johnson of Teledyne 
Brown Engineering for his succinct summary of the Soviet space 
program. 
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The breakdown of mission types changed a little in 1988 but 
this was due more to changes in the smaller programs as the 
photographic reconnaissance, communications, and man-related 
missions remained at 1987 levels. The high annual launch rate of 
Soviet satellites continues to be a direct consequence of their 
relatively short (by western standards) operational lifetimes. 
By the end of the year 49% of the missions begun in 1988 had 
already been terminated. 
A second f actor behind the pr 01 ific Sov iet space launches is 
the dependence of the Sov iet Union on the prol iferation of 
modest, cheaper satellites in lieu of a smaller number of more 
capable, expensive spacecraft. Standardization and manufacturing 
ease also drive this philosophy of simpler is better. As a 
result, Soviet space networks degrade gracefully through 
attrition, an attractive characteristic to both military and 
civilian users. Furthermore, failures can be overcome in short 
order. Six weeks after the SL-12 failure in February the launch 
vehicle was returned to service. Likewise, less than a month 
elapsed between the loss of a military photographic satellite and 
the launch of another in its class. 
Sometimes hidden behind the raw statistics and the bel ief 
that Soviet space systems are "old" and "unsophisticated" is the 
tremendous modernization which has taken place in the 1980 IS. 
Major new space systems have appeared in the Soviet program at a 
rate of four per year during the decade. Additionally, 
improvements of reliability and capability have occurred in other 
Soviet satellites. 
The sheer magnitude and compl exi ty of the Sov iet space 
program demands a tremendous support organization for the 
planning, manufacture, launch, and operation of satellites from 
dozens of individual proj ects. For the past 20 years a new 
Sov iet space mission has been started every four days on the 
average. During this same period that number of operational 
satellites being maintained has grown from about 50 spacecraft to 
150. According to the U. S. Department of Defense, the Sov iet 
Union now has at least 20 useable launch pads and could 
reconstitute almost all of its satellite constellations in 2-3 
months if the spacecraft were available. 
The or iginal Sov iet space launch compl ex, responsible for 
the launching of Sputnik 1, is located just east of the Aral Sea 
in Kazakhstan, north of Afghanistan, and is usually referred to 
as the Baikonur Cosmodrome or Tyuratam (the latter is an 
historical reference to a nearby rail stop). In 1988 Baikonur 
conducted 43 space launches. 
Baikonur is roughly analogous to the U. S. launch facil ities 
at Cape Canaveral. All manned space flights originate from there 
as do all geosynchronous, lunar, and planetaty craft. It is the 
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only facil ity capable of launching the Proton family of launch 
vehicles (SL-12 and SL-13), the SL-16 medium-lift booster and the 
new Energia (SL-17) heavy-lift/shuttle booster. All other Soviet 
launch vehicles can be launched from there with the exception of 
the small SL-8. 
Two of the most impressive features of the Soviet space 
program are its ability to conduct routine launches regardless of 
weather conditions and to carry out launches in rapid succession. 
The former was dramatically emphasized in March, 1988, when the 
SL-3 carrying an Indian satellite lifted off a pad at Baikonur on 
schedule in the midst of a driving snowstorm. Likewise, when the 
Buran (Russian for snowstorm) space shuttle made its first voyage 
in November the cloud ceil ing was down to a mere 410 m and the 
winds were gusting to more than 70 km/hr. The high winds which 
buffeted Buran were attributed to an approaching cyclone. 
On 18 occasions in 1988 two launchings were conducted within 
24 hours, including two instances in which less than two hours 
elapsed between flights. In just over a 20-hour period dur ing 
10-11 March the Soviet Union placed 10 satellites into orbit with 
three launch vehicles (SL-4, SL-6, SL-8) using two launch 
complexes (Plesetsk and Baikonur) • 
With the successful launch of the Buran space shuttle, the 
U.S.S.R. can now claim a launch vehicle arsenal of ten different 
boosters with payload capacities ranging from 1700 kg to more 
than 100,000 kg. For the 12 years prior to 1988, these launch 
vehicles placed an average 360 metr ic tons of payload (excluding 
rocket bodies) into Earth orbit annually. As the Energia becomes 
fully operational these figures may increase dramatically 
although a maximum of 4-5 such flights - with and without Buran -
per year is likely through the mid-1990's. 
Since 1979 the Soviets have concentrated on developing a 
capable geostationary network, placing an average of six 
satellites in this unique orbit 36,000 km above the equator each 
year. 
Another half dozen geosynchronous communications satellites 
were launched in 1988 while four resident satellites were 
abandoned or placed in storage locations to become inactive 
standbys. Two new slots in the geostationary ring were opened 
up, bringing the Soviet total to 17, and individual systems were 
expanded. By the end of the year 26 satellites were being 
maintained at operational locations, and four more were in 
apparent inactive standby status. 
Soviet geostationary communications satellites are currently 
divided among four distinct programs: Raduga, Gorizont, Ekran, 
and Kosmos. Raduga and Gorizont satellites, which account for 
the majority of Soviet operational geostationary spacecraft, are 
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general purpose communications satellites handling telephone, 
television, and telegraph traffic for civilian, military, and 
government subscriber. Ekran satellites represent a unique 
direct broadcast system for television programming, particularly 
to the sparsely populated interior regions of the U.S.S.R. 
Kosmos satellites are usually acknowledged as testbeds for new 
communications equipment. Dur ing 1988 the Gor izont and Ekran 
systems received two new satellites each while only one Raduga 
and one Kosmos spacecraft were launched. 
Ekran, debuted in 1976 as the world's first direct 
television broadcast satellite. Ekran is unique among all other 
geostationary satellites in many ways. First, since its 
transmissions are di rected pr imar ily at 40 percent of sov iet 
territory in the sparsely populated regions of the extreme 
northern and eastern portions of the U.S.S.R., the spacecraft can 
transmit directly in the television band (0.7 GHz) without fear 
of interference with other national television systems. A 
powerful 200-watt transmitter allows the construction of 
relatively simple communal or even individual receivers. Each 
day 18 to 20 hours of color TV and radio programming are 
broadcast. 
A more capable, general purpose communications satellite 
called Gorizont debuted in late 1978. This versatile Soviet 
communications satellite program is the geosynchronous 
counterpart to the Molniya 3 system. A typical Gor izont now 
carries eight transponders: six for 6/4 GHz, one for 14/11 GHz, 
and one for 1.6/1.5 GHz Gorizont satellites have taken over the 
majority of Intersputnik (a Soviet-led international 
communica tions network) traffic f rom the :r-lolniya 3 satellites. 
A total of 16 Gor izonts have now been placed in 
geosynchronous orbits and in general have demonstrated unusual 
longevity by Soviet standards. Gorizont 3, launched at the end 
of 1979, was still being controlled at the end of 1988. 
The civilian navigation satellite system is comprised of 
only. four satellites, whose orbi tal planes are separated by 45 
degrees of right ascension. 
The matur ation dur ing the past decade of remote sensing 
technology to evaluate the status of the Earth's natural 
resources represents perhaps the greatest impact of space 
exploration on the world's economy_ To profit from these new 
technologies the Soviet Union has assembled the world's most 
comprehensive network of diverse platforms and apparata to 
provide remote sensing data. These data are collected by visible 
and multi-spectral photography and infra-red, microwave, and 
radar soundings. 
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Resource-Ol, roughly analogous to the U. S. Landsat system, 
relies on multi-spectral data digitally transmitted from sun-
synchronous satellites. 
LAUNCH SERVICES 
Launch services include the Proton, Soyuz, Cyclone, Energia, 
and in the future the START. From a cost and timeliness 
standpoint, launch of the first three rockets from Baikonur, 
U. S. S. R. is preferred. However, studies have been done which 
indicate that these vehicles can be launched from numerous 
locations around the world. If an equatorial launch site is 
chosen, the weight capability is increased by one-third. For 
example, the Proton which can place a 2,200kg payload into 
geosynchronous orbi tal posi tion would be able to loft a 2,900kg 
payload from an equatorial location. The START launcher is fully 
transportable and the concept is to br ing the launch capabil i ty 
to the satellite owner rather than having the satellite owner go 
to the launcher. This will enabl e the ope rator to sel ect the 
most convenient launch location, taking into consideration weight 
and orbi tal parameters, personnel costs, time constraints and 
mission perspectives. 
The Proton is an ideal vehicle to launch commercial 
communications s.atellites because it can place even the heaviest 
of them directly into final orbital position. The trend in that 
industry is toward very heavy 8,000 to 11,000 pound satellites. 
western launch vehicles can only deliver these satellites to an 
intermediate orbit. The satellite must use its own fuel or an 
attached rocket engine to move to its final orbit. This fact is 
important because, if a satellite retains all its fuel, it can 
operate for several years longer and earn $40 to $50 million more 
in revenue. 
In September, 1988, the U.S. granted export licenses for the 
launch of three Hughes communications satellites from the Peoples 
Republ ic of China. Congress, however, blocked these exports 
after the Tian'anmen Square tragedy. Nonetheless, SCC has signed 
a Memorandum of Understanding with a corporation to launch a 
Hughes communications satellite on the Proton. The corporation 
has already obtained the U.S. government license it required to 
build and operate this satellite. It has agreed to be SCC's test 
case for a change in U. S. pol icy prohibi ting export of 
communications satellites to the Soviet Union. SCC plans to 
apply for the requi red export permits on behal f of the 
corporation in 1989. 
On July 29, 1989, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed 
by the Space Commerce Corporation and Technoprebor to explore the 
feasibility of building a derivative of the SS-20 called "START". 
The three-stage, solid fuel launcher will be capable of carrying 
a 300-lb. payload into an orbit of up to 500 km. (310 m!.). 
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• According to preliminary specifications, START will weigh 40-45 
metric tons (88,400-99,450 lb.) and will have an overall length 
of 20 meters (65.6 ft.), making it slightly larger than the two-
stage, 16.49 meter (54.1 ft.) SS-20. As with the SS-20, the 
START booster will be mounted on a transporter/launcher vehicle, 
enabling it to be launched from a variety of sites without 
special launching pads. 
COMMUNICATIONS 
This market consists of communications transponders, 
communications satellites, ground stations and special ized 
turnkey communications and navigation systems. 
A single transponder lease now costs $500,000 to $1,000,000 
per year. Demand is expected to grow through the mid 1990's. By 
1996, the number of transponders serving the U. S. is expected to 
grow from 524 to 710. Average transponder sale price during 1987 
was about $5.3 million. In recent Fee filings, AT&T estimated it 
would pay $489 million for two satellites. Hughes has priced two 
satellites at $422 million including launch. 
Due to the age of cur rent satellites, virtually every e and 
Ku band transponder now in use will be out of service by 1996. 
The largest transponder increase is expected to come in pr ivate 
networ ks, which will gr ow fran 94 today to 315 by the middl e of 
the next decade. 
The maj or segment of this market for see is the developing 
nations who do not need, and cannot afford, expensive western 
systems. These countries also need assistance, which see will 
provide, in working with international regulatory authorities. 
Soviet communications satellites have historically been 
highly elliptical Molniya satellites or geosynchronous Gorizonts 
with eight transponders. These have served the unique 
communication requirements of the U.S.S.R. In order to serve the 
world market with geosynchronous satellites, the Sov iets are 
developing a new satellite called "G LAV STAR " with 21 
transponders. One half will be e band and the other half Ku 
band. The footprint of the Gorizont transponders has been quite 
broad because of the vast territory covered. The new satellites 
will have a narrow beam to meet the needs of the developed and 
developing nations. 
In the long term, the company plans to build and launch 
communications satellite systems and to provide turnkey 
communications systems to end users, pr imarily in developing 
nations. 
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REMOTE SENSING 
There are cur rently 17 non-U. S. Landsat and/or French Spot 
Image remote sensing satellite systems. Three additional 
stations are under construction. These stations have a combined 
sunk cost of over $500 million. Each station cur rently pays 
$600,000 per year for its license to receive Landsat data. This 
fee, we understand, will increase to $800,000 per year in 1991. 
Spot Image is even more expensive than Landsat. 
The Landsat system may not be a dependable sour ce of this 
da tao It is expected that all of these stations and thei r 
customers may soon have to rely exclusively on foreign sources 
for current data for several years. 
The company will seek to provide data to these stations at a 
cost less than their current Landsat license. For support of 
those sales, the Sov iet government w ill guarantee a continuous 
supply of data until the year 2000. 
Remote sensing Soyuzkarta photographic images with Sm 
resol ution has in the past been pr ov ided by the Space Commerce 
Corpor ation. This had 1 imited commerci al val ue because of the 
restricted number of sensed areas available. SCC no longer 
handles these images but now markets remote sensing information 
from Resource-Ol. This satellite provides near real time digital 
data with 4Sm resolution. Early in 1990 the resolution will be 
reduced to 22.Sm. In the 1991-2 time frame Sm resolution will be 
available. This remote sensing satellite is now available for a 
cost of $lOOM, on orbit. This not only includes the satellite 
and launch costs, but the purchaser has the opportunity to tailor 
the instrumentation of the satellite to serve his particular 
needs. 
The U.S.S.R. has guaranteed the availability of this remote 
sensing data stream through the year 2000 and has given 
assurances with regard to access and coverage that the United 
Nations Principles on Remote Sensing will be followed. In 
addition to digital data, tapes will be available in a standard 
format. The Sov iet Union has an extensive capabil ity for val ue 
added work. Orders are being taken for studies tailored to a 
particular requirement. 
Addi tionally, the company has the abil ity to sell remote 
sensing products, including unique data from the COSMOS 1870 type 
radar observation satellite systems, which have no western 
equivalent. 
MATERIALS PROCESSIBG AID SCI,BftIPIC RESEARCQ IN SPACE 
Microgravity experiments and materials processing 
opportuni ties exist both man-tended aboard the MIR space station 
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and on the Photon satellite. This can be done in a routine 
regimen under current Soviet procedures or specialized equipment I 
can be created and flown for unique requirements. 
Several pr ivate companies in the U. S. and Europe have I 
contracted to fly unmanned experiments on the Sov iet ~lIR space 
station. NASA cur rently 1 ists a backlog on its waiting 1 ist of 
over 600 such experiments. The company expects to sell these I 
services primarily in Europe, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. 
SOVIET SPACE TOURS 
GLAVKOSMOS contr 01 s acce ss to all 
control facil ities in the Sov iet Union. 
visitors, no tours have been conducted 
demand. 
space launch and flight 
Except for distinguished 
in spi te of considerable 
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SCC tours are planned for 100 people each. The groups will I 
travel from New York/Washington, D.C. to Moscow. The first will 
be this Fall. These are handl ed by a subsi di ary of the Space 
Commerce Corporation: Aerospace Marketing Group, a Texas 
Corporation, 4131 Spicewood Springs Road, Suite G-4, Austin, I 
Texas 78759, telephone (512) 338-4800. 
Members of the tour will visit space vehicle processing I 
facilities, white rooms, cosmonaut training facilities, space 
rockets and launch pads, in addition to Star City, Intercosmos 
Headquarters, Space Research Institute, Soviet Mission Control, I 
and Russia's National Space Museum, pI us space memor ial sand 
monuments in greater Moscow and Leningrad. 
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